New Updates

A lot has happened since my last update. First, I finished my dissertation! Second, I got a job! I’ll be a post-doctoral research associate at Brown University’s Political Theory Project. Hopefully you will forgive my absence. If you’re interested in what I’ve been working on, please see the dissertation. I’ll post new working papers in the next month or so.

New Dis Page

Several updates worth noting. First, I’ve created a dissertation page with a complete (though not final) draft available for (partial) download.  I am in the process of editing it, heavily in some parts. Second, I’ve created a publications page with links to my published articles and PDF versions of the page proofs. Finally, I’ve updated my working papers and removed some of them, as they are on review. From this website, you can download copies of ten of my publications, working papers and dissertation chapters. Enjoy!

Paper Updates

I’ve just posted updates to my first two dissertation chapters and my piece on Steven Wall’s perfectionist defense of toleration. Also, my paper on the accessibility requirement got picked up by the Journal of Moral Philosophy, so it’s in near final draft form. I’ll be posting drafts of chapters three, four, five and six of my dissertation in the next two weeks. The first half the dissertation is nearing completion.

Reworking Toleration Paper

I’m currently massively reworking a paper on religious toleration and liberal perfectionism. It turns out that Steve Wall’s liberal perfectionist take on toleration is intricate enough that I need to spend the entire paper on it.  I suspect the paper will be much improved.  The main issue is this: liberal perfectionists have a teleological political theory, they think value is to be promoted. However, perfectionists recognize that we have reason to respect others and that the kind of value we ascribe to people when we respect them is not the sort of thing that it is appropriate to maximize. That said, they still have to ground reasons to respect others in reasons to promote objective value. Wall has something close to a theory about how this works. And I now think that grounding reasons to respect in reasons to promote is the problem my paper is really trying to get at. I think we can’t make sense of religious toleration is we have to make sense of our reasons to respect the religious liberties of others in terms of what objective values those liberties promote.

I should have a new draft of it up by the end of the week. For now, I will leave the original paper posted.

I’m also posting the second chapter of my dissertation. In it, I explain the structure of justificatory liberalism and ground it in the second-person standpoint and contractualist moral theory. It turns out that the connection is harder to sustain than you might think. I hope that when the reader reaches the end of the chapter, she will see the moral idea justificatory liberalism is supposed to express. In the third and fourth I do the same for the moral idea at the root of the concerns advanced by religious critics of justificatory liberalism. That’s the first half of the dissertation.