

The Justice Argument Against Catholic Integralism

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Abstract

Catholic integralism claims that governments must secure the earthly and heavenly common good. God authorizes two powers to do so. The state governs in matters temporal, the Catholic Church in matters spiritual. Since the church has the nobler end of salvation, it may direct the state to help enforce church law. The integralist adopts two seemingly conflicting norms of justice: (a) coercion into the faith is always unjust, but (b) coercion to keep the faith is just. But if religious coercion is wrong at the start of the Christian life, why is it permitted after that? The integralist answer is *baptism*. Baptism serves as a *normative transformer*: it transforms religious coercion from unjust to just. My thesis is that baptism fails as a normative transformer. I critique Thomas Aquinas' approach to this question and then adapt gratitude, associative, and natural duty theories of political obligation to repair his argument. These strategies fail.

Keywords

integralism, liberalism, Catholicism, baptism, Aquinas

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Liberalism is taking a beating. Many deny, evermore boldly, that freedom and equality are central political values. The fiercest challengers are *religious anti-liberals*. These groups argue that the state should promote the authentic human good with coercion if necessary. But in contrast to liberal perfectionism, which places autonomy at the heart of the good life,¹ religious anti-liberals argue that spiritual goods form the centerpiece of human flourishing. The chief spiritual good is communion or friendship with the divine. Such communion also takes a corporate form: religious believers flourish in communities that collectively form a relationship with a deity, such as God, Allah, or Heaven.

Religious anti-liberals disagree about which religion is true. But they agree that liberalism must go. Liberalism's stress on autonomy undermines our capacity to organize around spiritual ends, and it even allows people to harm local communities already oriented around these ends.

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Religious anti-liberalisms once ruled the world. Over the past few decades, they have returned to their places of power. Once a secular regime, Turkey has moved in an Islamic direction, and not the only Muslim nation to do so. Hindutva, the dominant form of Hindu nationalism, rises in India. Vladimir Putin gives state privilege to the Russian Orthodox Church. Poland and Hungary have become illiberal democracies that promote Catholic values; Catholic anti-liberalism also influences the American conservative movement. Political theorists have strong reasons to engage these views.

I argue against Catholic integralism.² Integralists say governments must secure the earthly and heavenly common good. God authorizes two powers to do so. The state governs in matters temporal, the church in matters spiritual. Sometimes the missions of church and state intersect. In these cases, the church is sovereign owing to its nobler, spiritual purpose. It may direct the state to help advance its spiritual objectives. In particular, the state may enforce church law in some cases.

I discuss integralism to show how to assess religious anti-liberalisms as a class. I focus on it because my reader is likely familiar with Catholic Christianity and can explore religious anti-liberalisms better from within a religious tradition they recognize. I also engage integralism because it figures into the canon of political philosophy. The social contract tradition originated in response to Christian integralism.³ The culprit was often Catholic, but Presbyterian and Anglican integralism came in for criticism too.⁴

Here, I focus on integralism's political theology of baptism. The integralist adopts two norms of justice that seem to conflict. First, Catholic dogma states that no one may force anyone else into the faith. Yet second, and with the medieval church, the integralist allows religious coercion of the baptized: Christian states may press people to remain in the faith by punishing heretics and apostates. But if religious coercion is wrong at the start of the Christian life, why is it permitted after that? The integralist appeals to *baptism*. Baptism serves as a *normative transformer*: it transforms religious coercion from unjust to just.

My thesis is that baptism cannot serve as a normative transformer, which entails that two norms of integralist justice conflict. The norms do not strictly contradict one another. Instead, integralists can resolve strict contradictions, but only if they postulate *ad hoc* harmonizing propositions.

To examine whether baptism is a normative transformer, I will first address the resolution proposed by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas argues that baptism transforms the morality of religious coercion because it involves a vow to God to obey the church. Most people generally think it is wrong to force someone to make a vow but that one may enforce the vow thereafter. If baptism involves a vow, then that solves the baptism dilemma.

Aquinas reconciled the tension by examining the character of baptism. He argues not only that baptism involves a vow to obey the church, but that heresy and apostasy violate that vow. The church may direct the state to help it punish vow-breakers. Aquinas also argued that the state must protect people from spiritual harm, so we should punish baptismal oath-breakers for this reason too.

Aquinas thought enforcement could be severe. Heretics merit stern spiritual penalties, like excommunication. He taught that the church might punish heretics after attempts to correct them.⁵ If the baptized person does not relent, heresy deserves strict physical penalties, like execution.⁶ When setting a sentence, the state must also consider community salvation, which further justifies harsh punishment.

I argue that Aquinas' resolution fails, as infant baptism illustrates. Catholicism teaches that baptism changes the will, but not as the integralist requires because infants make no promises at their baptism. Indeed, they make no promises at all.

Stopping spiritual harm cannot justify religious coercion by itself. The unbaptized can create spiritual damage, but that fact does not justify force; here, Aquinas is clear: no person may baptize another against their will.

After arguing that Aquinas' solution fails, I adapt contemporary theories of political obligation to explain enforceable religious duties. I focus on gratitude, associative obligations, and natural duties of religion. But none of these theories work.

I now introduce Catholic integralism and explore its doctrine of religious liberty. I develop the baptism dilemma and argue that the vowing solution fails. The latter half of the article examines solutions drawn from theories of political obligation.

Catholic Integralism

Integralism synthesizes political perfectionism with Roman Catholicism. In academic political theory, the dominant perfectionism is liberal. The best life for humans includes autonomy; the state should help people live free lives. Many natural law theorists adopt a non-liberal perfectionist politics. Autonomy may have instrumental value, but not intrinsic value, and it does not lay at the heart of a life well-lived.

Non-liberal perfectionists, nonetheless, insist that the state should promote natural goods—intrinsic goods that one can grasp through the use of reason.⁷ But most natural lawyers agree that the state should not advance supernatural interests, like union with God. Nor should it forcibly create the traits and tools needed to maintain that union.

Integralists dissent. The state should also promote supernatural goods, though only with church authorization.⁸ They favor a particular institutional structure for advancing the supernatural good, which Pope Leo XIII called a soul–body union between church and state.⁹ The pope and his bishops rule in spiritual affairs. They have infallible teaching authority and can create canon law. In some cases, the church can deputize the state to impose civil punishments on its members; the government may punish the baptized for grave sin, apostasy, and heresy.¹⁰ In the Late Middle Ages, these regimes imprisoned and executed heretics.¹¹

Integralist regimes used additional policy tools to stabilize themselves. They educated (some) of their citizens in Catholic doctrine. They controlled communication to discourage the spread of heretical ideas. They persecuted religious minorities to protect Christians from spiritual harm.¹² Integralist regimes did not always suppress heretics and heretical groups. From time to time, regions went rogue, such as Languedoc during the Cathar heresy and Prague during the Hussite rebellions.¹³ Popes called crusades to conquer and convert these regions. They claimed the right to depose rulers who adopted or permitted heresy.¹⁴

Liberal and integralist states recognize different rights, especially on religious freedom. Liberal states protect the universal free exercise of religion. While many liberal states have established religions, the establishment does not require coercion.

In contrast, integralist governments favor coercively established religion. Even in the ideal case, they only safeguard the free exercise of religion for unbaptized citizens. Yet to advance Catholic ends, the church-authorized state may enforce canon law against the baptized. If the church excommunicates a heretic and he keeps preaching, the state may punish him.¹⁵ Punishments can range from fines to imprisonment.¹⁶ Yet sometimes, the integralist state may go further. It could limit the liberty of the unbaptized in the name of suppressing spiritual harm. Francisco Suarez endorsed such severe restrictions, such as

forcing Jews to listen to the Gospel and imposing “a penalty on those who refuse to hear.”¹⁷

Centuries after these unjust laws disappeared, popes still supported restrictions on liberal freedoms. Leo XIII opposed total freedom of speech and the press.¹⁸ Integralists Thomas Crean and Alan Fimister allow limiting voting rights to Catholics.¹⁹

Integralism and Religious Liberty

During Vatican II (1962–1965), the council published a controversial document on religious freedom. Called *Dignitatis Humanae* (*DH*), it recognizes extensive religious liberties and teaches that unbaptized persons have a moral right against religious coercion.²⁰ The overwhelmingly dominant interpretation of *DH* is that everyone has such a right. Let’s review the liberties *DH* embraces.

Religious Liberties

DH recognizes extensive religious liberties. Religious communities may “govern themselves according to their own norms.” They may create their own educational institutions. The law may not interfere with selecting, training, appointing, or transferring ministers. It may not restrict the construction of houses of worship. Religious communities may teach their faith in public. They can do so through speech or in print.²¹

Parents have the right to live their own domestic religious life. They can determine how they educate their children. The government may not force them into alien education systems.²²

DH states that the common good requires equal treatment before the law, so the state cannot treat someone as an inferior “for religious reasons.”²³ It prohibits religious discrimination.

Restricting religious freedom violates God’s will and the rights of the person. No one may use force to “destroy or repress religion” among men, within a country, or a “definite community.”²⁴

DH gives moral reasons, not prudential reasons, in favor of these liberties. The right to religious freedom “has its foundation in the dignity of the person.” The church grounds religious freedom in divine revelation that affirms human dignity.²⁵

DH argues that our response to God in faith must be free. And so, no one may force another “to embrace the Christian faith against his own will.” The act of faith by nature is a “free act.”²⁶ Man cannot affirm revelation unless he offers God “reasonable and free submission.” For this reason, in religious matters, “every manner of coercion on the part of men should be excluded.”²⁷ And again: “The person in society is to be kept free from all manner of coercion in matters religious.”²⁸

God respects our freedom to reject Him. He places us “under no compulsion.” Jesus did not use force or coercion to bring people to the Father.²⁹ Here, we have a moral argument drawn from revelation and not mere natural law. Natural morality and divine revelation show the injustice of religious coercion.

These claims sound universal. The claims sound even more universal when we note *DH*’s major premise. We only adopt religion when we adopt it as true from our own perspective, and we cannot come to the one true faith save from our own perspective.

The Second Vatican Council seemingly applied these arguments to the unbaptized, or *DH* gives that impression at first glance.

The Continuity Objection to the Standard Reading

Thomas Pink argues that the standard reading of *DH* contradicts earlier church teaching. Since its first article claims that *DH* contradicts no earlier church teaching, Pink argues that we should read *DH* as continuous with those teachings. Pink's case for continuity relies on his reading of the teachings of Leo XIII and the Council of Trent. The standard reading of *DH* contradicts Leo XIII and Trent.

Pink focuses on Leo XIII's teaching in *Immortale Dei* and the earlier decree of the Council of Trent (session seven canon 14).³⁰ Let's begin with Leo XIII's apparent endorsement of integralism:

The Almighty, therefore, has given the charge of the human race to two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each . . . There must, accordingly, exist between the two powers a certain orderly connection, which may be compared to the union of the soul and body in man.³¹

Leo XIII teaches that God has established two polities (*potestas*). These are the spiritual and temporal powers. God has authorized the leaders of each government to advance their part of the common good. The state protects the earthly common good, and the church protects the spiritual common good. But, the church has higher, eternal aims. And so, as the integralist reads Leo XIII, the church may tell states to advance its objectives, much as the soul directs the body. Leo XIII thought that the church might direct the state to discipline baptized Christians. The baptized have become citizens of the church, after all; and like citizens of the state, they must obey the law of their polity. In this case, the polity is the church.

Owing to Leo XIII's authority, integralism remained influential into the twentieth century. Pope Pius X (1903–1914) likely held it.³² The 1917 canon law code listed baptized Protestants as subjects of ecclesiastical laws.³³ For Pink, this means that the church could, if it decided, direct Christian states to punish Protestants for canonical crimes.³⁴

The Council of Trent appears to endorse integralist coercion. Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) offered a brief policy recommendation in his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. He thought authorities should ask young Catholics whether they affirm their baptismal vows. If they do not, the church may punish them for ecclesiastical crimes only through denial of the sacraments.³⁵ Trent condemned Erasmus' teaching. Doing so appears to affirm a key integralist plank—baptism subjects one to civil censure for violating canon law:

If anyone says that when they grow up, those baptized as little children should be asked whether they wish to affirm what their godparents promised in their name when they were baptized; and that, when they reply that they have no such wish, they should be left to their own decision and not, in the meantime, be coerced by any penalty into the Christian life, except that they be barred from the reception of the eucharist and the other sacraments, until they have a change of heart: let him be anathema.³⁶

For Pink, Trent claims that baptism obligates everyone “to keep the faith as adults.” If they culpably refuse to keep the faith, that licenses temporal punishment, including, Pink argues, punishment by the state.³⁷ The church may go further than “denial of the

sacraments . . .” by deputizing the state to aid it, or so that is how the council fathers at Trent understood it.³⁸ Infant baptisms, Pink claims, were no exception.

Pink’s Reinterpretation

In response to the threat of discontinuity, Pink provides a narrower read of *DH*. According to Pink, it recognizes a universal right of religious freedom against states but not against the church. The state lacks the authority to use religious coercion on its own.³⁹ But *DH* allows that the church may restrict the religious liberties of its members by calling on Christian states to assist it, even if that is no longer church policy.

If Pink is correct, the church can deputize the state to enforce canon law. But canon law only covers the baptized, not the unbaptized. So, I assume that freedoms mentioned in *DH* apply to the unbaptized who live in integralist states.

In this essay, I grant Pink’s interpretation of *DH*. Otherwise, *DH* appears to prohibit integralism, which renders the problem of the paper uninteresting. Furthermore, *DH* provides authoritative (if not infallible) interpretations of the requirements of natural law that apply across time and space. Integralists cannot dismiss it lightly. And, indeed, no integralist rejects *DH* as far as I know.⁴⁰

Does the Church Have the Power to Coerce?

Suppose baptism renders baptismal coercion permissible. This entails that the church may authorize the state to use physical coercion. Here is a typical response. The church has no authority to use physical coercion and cannot allow the state to use it as a result. The church cannot grant a power that it does not have.

Integralists can argue that the church has the authority to use spiritual coercion and then extend that authority to physical coercion. The argument formalized:

1. The church has divine authorization to use spiritual coercion.
2. If (1), the church has divine authorization to use coercion resembling spiritual coercion.
3. Physical coercion resembles spiritual coercion.
4. The church has divine authorization to use physical coercion.⁴¹ (1, 2, 3)

Since physical coercion resembles spiritual coercion, the church may use physical coercion.

What should we make of this argument? Most Catholics affirm (1), and (4) follows from (1)–(3). So, let’s consider (2) and (3). I have trouble assessing (3) because I don’t know how to evaluate the resemblance relation. Obviously, physical coercion resembles spiritual coercion because both are coercive. But is that a good argument for extending the permissibility of the one to the other?

Furthermore, church tradition has long distinguished between spiritual and physical coercion.⁴² Spiritual coercion is central to church functioning. Physical coercion is not. Similarly, priests may use spiritual coercion but not physical coercion.

Here’s a case for (3). To judge resemblance, we could appeal to what justifies spiritual coercion. The justification is that spiritual coercion helps preserve the salvation of its members, and physical coercion might help. If so, physical and spiritual coercion can both discipline the errant.

What about (2)? Spiritual coercion keeps people upright, and so does physical coercion.⁴³

We can expand on this point: the church may use physical coercion owing to its status as a perfect society (*communitas perfecta*). Leo XIII taught that the church holds every power needed to pursue its mission.⁴⁴ It may legislate on matters “within its competence.”⁴⁵ If physical coercion helps advance its mission, the church has the authority to exercise it. Physical coercion may lie outside the church’s competence. It can nonetheless extend its authority to a competent power, that is, the state.⁴⁶

But consider the following. The church could learn to use coercion well. It ruled the Papal States for centuries. If so, the church could rule in temporal affairs if it likes. But then we lose our grasp on why God would assign the state temporal authority if the church can rule well. Why not make every state a papal state? Why not hierocracy?

I would respond like so. Today the church lacks the competence for modern governance. Furthermore, it may have lacked competence even when it governed the Papal States. Temporal authority saddled the papacy with earthly temptations. So, it may have governed well in temporal affairs, but earthly rule compromised its rule in spiritual matters. Any integralist can think the Papal States were a bad idea.

So, if baptism is a normative transformer, integralism might be true. As a perfect society, the church may use physical coercion, though using coercion is unwise, as the state lacks competence to use physical coercion well. The church can thus authorize the state to use physical coercion on the baptized. We can see why the church could have the power to physically coerce the baptized.

I have now set up the baptism dilemma with two claims. Religious coercion of the unbaptized is unjust, as it violates natural law. Yet integralists permit religious coercion of the baptized. So, if baptism is not a normative transformer, post-baptismal coercion violates natural law.

I call this argument the *baptism dilemma*. I will now detail it before addressing several candidate resolutions.

The Baptism Dilemma

The baptism dilemma arises from integralists embrace of two teachings that seem to conflict. The Catholic Church teaches that forced baptism is wrong. People have a fundamental right to religious freedom because the choice of faith must be free. Yet if integralists are correct, church-authorized states may prohibit the baptized from rejecting the Catholic faith. Or at least doing so in public.⁴⁷ But if faith must begin free, why not after that?

Again, baptism makes the difference: integralists say that it functions as a normative transformer. According to this concept, a normative transformer is some state of affairs or act that “transforms an unjust situation into a just one.”⁴⁸ Baptism changes a person’s liberties. Before baptism, a person is free to accept or reject the faith, but not afterward.⁴⁹ If the state forces her into religion, it acts unjustly, but it acts justly if it forces her to remain in the faith.

But what is baptism? How does it work? To most, baptism is mere water and words. Or, for certain Protestants, baptism signals a commitment to the faith. Or it signals the dedication of one’s parents.

For Roman Catholics, matters are more radical:

Through baptism, we are freed from sin and reborn as sons of God; we become members of Christ, are incorporated into the Church, and made sharers in her mission.⁵⁰

Baptism is necessary for salvation, as commanded by Christ (John 3:5).⁵¹ Baptism has two main effects: “purification from sins and new birth in the Holy Spirit.”⁵² God forgives all sins through baptism, including original sin. God also remits punishment for sin. Nothing stands in the way of salvation. Yet temporal consequences of sin remain. People still suffer, get sick, and die. And they keep an inclination to sin that theologians call “concupiscence.”⁵³

Baptized Christians now receive the grace of justification. We can believe in God, hope in God, and love God through the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love. We can live and act through the prompting of the Holy Spirit and experience the Spirit’s gifts.

Baptism makes us part of the church, the body of Christ. The baptized no longer belongs to himself but to “him who died and rose for us.”⁵⁴ Baptism assigns new responsibilities in the church and the right to receive its gifts.

Baptism is an eternal seal, a spiritual mark, and no sin can erase it.⁵⁵ Furthermore, no one can undo their baptism. Expatriation from the church is impossible, in contrast to the state. Following one’s baptism, one has membership at every point in spacetime. A billion years in the future, a billion light-years away, it makes no difference. This point matters greatly for our purposes. The impossibility of exit means that the baptized person cannot shed her enforceable obligations, even if she expatriates from the state.⁵⁶

Another critical point: baptism gives the will new powers. Again, we can now cooperate and unite with God. But while baptism gives infants new inclinations or capacities, it does not give them new acts. A promise is, by necessity, an action and not an ability.⁵⁷

One cannot retreat to the claim that only adult baptism generates enforceable obligations. That position runs too close to Erasmus. And again, the integralist believes the church permanently condemned Erasmus’ view. Pink seems to say this. Baptism suffices to make one liable for heresy and apostasy in an integralist state.⁵⁸

The Tridentine teaching strikes many as unjust. But note that it only legitimizes punishment in some cases and does not license punishing the inculpable. Suppose that baptized Reba was raised outside the church. She grows up and preaches heresy. Here Reba’s actions lack culpability and so natural law forbids punishing her. She has “invincible ignorance”—non-culpable intellectual errors.⁵⁹

This maneuver may help the integralist avoid grim punishments, but it does not save him. Here I ask whether baptism creates legal liabilities, not when violations of canon law are culpable.

Whether baptism creates legal liabilities has great importance, and one wants to know how it works. It seems strange that states cannot force people into the faith but can make them remain in it, and odder still to think that baptism makes the difference.

I can state the baptism dilemma more clearly. The reasons that ground a right of religious freedom apply to the baptized, so baptism must provide overriding reasons for religious coercion. These overriding reasons cannot license coercing the unbaptized. Baptism needs an element necessary and sufficient to assign legal liabilities, but no such element exists.

A Thomistic Resolution: Baptismal Vows

Aquinas' Resolution

Contemporary integralists do not face the baptism dilemma by themselves. Aquinas also grapples with it. I engage Aquinas to illustrate the power of the baptism dilemma: the most famous Catholic theologian took the problem seriously.

I follow Gregory Reichberg's interpretation of Aquinas on these matters.⁶⁰ His reading helps formulate the problem, even if one wants to differ with him in some details.

Aquinas addresses religious freedom in the *Summa Theologica*.⁶¹ The Church Fathers and councils prohibit coercion into the faith.⁶² Aquinas concludes that "deliberate action to impede [religious] freedom" is unjust.⁶³ Aquinas says: "under no condition may [unbelievers] be compelled to the faith." The act of believing "pertains to the will."⁶⁴ The context refers to a person who considers whether to embrace the faith for the first time.

For Aquinas, "the will cannot be forced. It seems then that unbelievers should not be compelled to the faith."⁶⁵ Aquinas elaborates in his commentary on the Gospel of John.⁶⁶ No one believes "unless he wills to do so." Drawing near the Father "cannot result from violence." So, one cannot use brute force or "the conditional violence of coercion" that comes from threats of harm. People must have freedom of choice to act on their budding desire for God.⁶⁷

According to Reichberg, for Aquinas, "Theological faith requires voluntariness in the strong sense of the term." When I choose to believe in God, "my heart must be directed to the reason motivating faith—divine truth as source of my beatitude—for its own sake."⁶⁸ On this view, "coercion is antithetical to the very nature of faith." Aquinas claims that no one comes to the faith "by violence." For "it is only willingly, not despite ourselves, that we are saved."⁶⁹ Aquinas strongly supports religious freedom.⁷⁰

The first half of the baptism dilemma comes into focus: no one may force an unbaptized person into the faith. Now the second half, as Aquinas justifies punishing heretics and apostates:⁷¹

The Church does not have a mandate to punish unbelief . . . in those who have never received the faith . . . A sentence of punishment can however be passed on the unbelief of those who have received the faith.⁷²

Aquinas thinks some political authority (perhaps the church-authorized state) can force people to return to the church and that it can prohibit them from leaving.

Many Catholics think this practice has a basis in medieval canon law. The Fourth Council of Toledo prohibited forced baptisms, but allowed the state to force baptized Jews to remain in the faith.⁷³ Leaving the faith after receiving it is akin to blasphemy, which states may prohibit. But Aquinas does not endorse this rationale, perhaps for the following excellent reason: the state should not force people to remain in the faith merely because their defection would subject God to bad press.

The Thomistic baptism dilemma is plain: we cannot compel unbelievers to the faith but in some cases, baptized believers can be compelled to the faith.⁷⁴

On this reading of Aquinas, how does he resolve the tension? His chief reason concerns the nature of vows. Aquinas says: "making a vow is a matter of will, keeping it is a matter of necessity," where a matter of "necessity" entails an obligation to keep the vow.⁷⁵ Vowing must be free, but keeping it need not be.⁷⁶ Aquinas says:

There are those who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates. These unbelievers should be made to undergo even bodily compulsion, that they may fulfill what they have promised, and adhere to what they at one time undertook.⁷⁷

Conversion to Christianity implies an unchangeable commitment to remain one. The state cannot induce faith through coercion, but it can sustain faith—those who join the faith promise to stick with it.

Aquinas says little more about the promise-baptism analogy. We must stray beyond the text to explore his solution.⁷⁸

Reichberg tries to resolve the tension as follows. He distinguishes between accepting the faith and professing it. Acceptance involves an incoercible act of the will. Professing faith consists in communicating one's beliefs and promises through outward signs. New Christians (or their parents or godparents) renounce the devil and consent to the faith in the baptismal rite. The state punishes people for violating this public vow. It punishes an external act alone, so the church-authorized state restricts apostasy and heresy in their public expression.⁷⁹

If so, the church may punish the unbelief of those who have received the faith. Adults incur similar punishments for their children when baptizing them.⁸⁰

I suspect fear drove Aquinas' reasoning; we will see below that fear probably drove the reasoning of Trent's council fathers as well. They worried that if authorities allow heresy, they will thereby endanger civic peace and unity.⁸¹ If authorities allow apostasy, they would effectively give competitor groups fresh recruits. Aquinas still tries to justify punishment on grounds other than good consequences—the state cannot punish John simply because he endangers civic unity. John might do so by accident. Punishment implies guilt, and innocent unbaptized people can unintentionally threaten civic unity. One must not punish the inculpable, consequences aside.

Pink does not attempt to resolve the baptism dilemma, but as the leading living integralist, he needs a rationale. He mentions punishments like removal from office. Yet he downplays capital punishment, exile, and restrictions on public worship.⁸² Pink needs to provide a further rationale for drawing the dividing line as he has.

A final point concerns the relationship between a vow and baptism. *Someone* makes a vow at one's baptism. But the act of baptism is distinct from the act of vowing. Christians can perform both acts separately. I can validly baptize a baby without an express vow as long as I baptize her in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Again, baptism is necessary and sufficient for legal liability in an integralist regime.

If so, vows can only resolve the baptism dilemma if baptism is necessary and sufficient for a vow to take place. What a strange claim! Vows involve actions, but baptism only bestows habits, powers, and dispositions.

Godparental Vowing

Trent drew the canon on baptism from a censure of Erasmus issued by the Parisian Faculty of Theology. The censure is informative. The Parisian theologians write:

[Erasmus's] advice, in so far as it urges us to seek out those baptized as infants when they are grown up and to ask them whether they assent to *what their godparents promised in their names at baptism*, and, if they do not approve, finds it perhaps expedient to leave them to their own thoughts until they come to their senses, and in the meantime not to punish them except by not

administering the sacraments of the church to them, is ungodly and tends toward the destruction of the faithful, *opening up a path to the abolition of the Christian religion*.⁸³

Their worry is that those consulted,

. . . will persevere in their perversity and will soon fall away from Christianity, both they themselves and many others by their example.⁸⁴

We receive two essential details. First, we learn why Trent resisted Erasmus' advice. If followed, Christians will remain in sin. Worse, the practice would depopulate the church.

Second, we know *who* vows on behalf of infants: godparents. If so, Aquinas may have had godparents in mind with infant baptism.

This *godparent condition* raises a dilemma: either the godparent vow is necessary for church citizenship or not. If baptism suffices, then the godparent condition falls away. But if baptism requires a godparent vow, baptism alone cannot legitimize integralist coercion.

The first horn of the dilemma gives up on the proposal. The second horn of the dilemma raises two problems: one simple, the other complex.

First, the simple problem: we degrade baptism if we make the godparent vow necessary for baptism to hold. Baptism saves us; that a godparent refuses to vow can't deprive an infant of baptism's full power.

Now the complex problem. Suppose that godparents know that baptism gives their godchild new legal liabilities. They then refuse to vow. The Church must decide whether to baptize anyway. They cannot refuse to baptize. That would deprive the child of spiritual benefits. But if they baptize anyway, godparents have a weak incentive to take the vow. Without the vow, the infant receives the benefits of baptism without the costs—costs that could lead to the infant's execution if she becomes a heretic as an adult. That means, in time, godparent vows will decline, if not vanish. Since the church-authorized state cannot coerce un-vowed, baptized Christians, the integralist citizenry will shrink. The state will decay.

The integralist might maintain that pious godparents will make the vow anyway, since it pleases God and helps them care for the infant's soul. But godparents' desire to protect their godchild from prosecution might prove overriding.

So, the godparent vow does not solve the problem raised by infant baptism. Integralists must maintain that baptism suffices to license religious coercion.

The Value of Vowing

Maybe baptism need only resemble vowing. Baptism shares with vowing an underlying value that explains how both baptism and vows create enforceable obligations.⁸⁵

Consider the reasons that promises bind. One can give a contractarian or consequentialist answer, but integralists reject the associated moral theories. Instead, they might ground vowing in our interest in "forming intimate relations with others . . ."⁸⁶ Baptism works similarly: it creates intimate relations with *God and the Church*. And so, if vows bind because they enable close relationships, baptism binds too.

We do not baptize people against their will, much as we avoid forced vows. What of infants? The infant does not refuse to vow; she is non-willing, not unwilling. So, if infant

baptism benignly increases the infant's flourishing, it may create an enforceable obligation since it does not violate the infant's will.

Yet the infant may have different beliefs about baptism when she reaches adulthood. For instance, she may no longer believe in God. Baptism might not bind in this case. A critic could reply that our vows still bind even if our beliefs change. Analogously, belief change will not dissolve our baptismal obligations. Yet a vow seems binding only when we can discover that we made one. While we can usually recall our vows, we never recall our infant baptism. Others may hide it from us.

The analogical defense of baptism has two more problems. Imagine that someone baptizes an infant against her parents' will. The child grows up in another religious community, say a Jewish one. Her baptism permits the church-authorized state to remove her from her family and faith community. Baptism, in general, might help us form intimate relations with other people, especially our co-religionists. But in this case, it licenses the destruction of relationships.

Promises create obligations partly because our power to bind ourselves helps us flourish. Thus, vows that undermine our well-being may not bind. A vow to be someone's slave does not conduce to anyone's interests. Along the same lines, baptism benefits us, but its binding power could decay if it licenses severing us from our community. Baptism would set back our good.

The analogy with vowing endures, though it no longer supports the integralist's case. The binding force of baptism collapses in cases where the integralist must affirm that baptismal obligations endure. Namely, the case where baptism licenses removing a child from family and community.

Second, while baptism changes the will, it does not produce specific obligations. It unites one with God, yes. But baptism itself, in virtue of its similarity to vowing, does not fix the content of our duties. When I make a vow, I expressly swear to concrete conditions. But baptism is not like this. And so, baptism will not provide one with specific obligations, such as obeying the church-authorized state. I will say more on this matter in the gratitude section.

For all Catholics, baptism creates intimate relations with God. The integralist can rest baptism's transformative power by analogy with making a vow to God. If so, religious coercion by the church-authorized state could damage our relationships with other humans. But such coercion might not damage our relationship with God but preserve it. Friendship with God has paramount importance. So baptism can justify obligations to God by analogy with vows of obedience.

But now we need to know if God has deputized the state to serve as the secular arm of His church. In short, let's grant baptism creates obligations to God. How do obligations to God explain our duty to obey the church-authorized state? Most Catholics reject that we have such a duty, so what can integralists say to them now?

I return to this last point in my discussion of gratitude and associative theories.

Theories Set Aside: Consent, Fair Play, Natural Duties of Justice

The integralist must locate a feature of baptism that licenses integralist coercion but not forced conversion. I now adapt contemporary theories of political obligation to explore whether they can identify the feature of baptism that can resolve the baptism dilemma. The adapted theories must explain why baptism is a normative transformer.

The most familiar theory of political obligation is the consent theory. In this view, people gain political obligations when they consent to state authority, yet few expressly or even tacitly consent to political order. Integralists will grimace: they disdain consent accounts of political obligation for excessive individualism. They will not appeal to these theories.

Fair play theories hold that “everyone who participates in a reasonably just, mutually beneficial cooperative practice—as an obligation to bear a fair share of the burdens of the practice.”⁸⁷ To enjoy the benefits of cooperation, members of a society must share the burdens of maintaining it. They can share these benefits by obeying the law. When citizens obey the law, the government can better benefit everyone. This theory has similarities to gratitude theories, which I think better capture the relationship between God, the church, and the individual Christian. I defer further discussion of this point until the next section.

Finally, I set aside natural duty theories where we have responsibilities simply by being human beings.⁸⁸ The natural duty of *justice* is to follow the correct principles of justice, or natural law in this case. However, I will address a modified theory on which the Church can establish its authority through natural duties of *religion*. Religion, going back to Aquinas, but as rearticulated by John Finnis, grounds a duty to seek harmony with the greater-than-human order.⁸⁹

Gratitude Theories

Baptism bestows an infinite benefit on the baptized: salvation. Obligations of gratitude mandate reciprocation under certain conditions. One case occurs when the benefactor requests aid. In some instances, gratitude requires reciprocating benefits as the benefactor desires. In the case of baptism, Christians owe God a debt of gratitude. If Catholicism is true, He asks us to respond by obeying His church. If integralism is true, He also asks us to submit to the deputized state. Baptism will create an enforceable duty of gratitude if these conditions hold. If one refuses to obey, he displays ingratitude.

This argument has many steps. To clarify, I alter a typical gratitude-based case for political obligation:⁹⁰

1. God, through the Catholic Church, benefits the baptized.
2. The baptized thus owe obligations of gratitude to God.
3. Among these are obligations to obey the church and its secular arm.
4. The baptized must obey the church and its secular arm. (2, 3)
5. Apostasy and heresy violate the obligation of gratitude to God.
6. Thus, the baptized must avoid apostasy and heresy. (4, 5)

If Catholicism is true, premise (1) is true. The basic logic of gratitude grounds premise 2. We owe duties of gratitude to those who deliberately benefit us.

Premise (3) justifies an obligation to obey canon law and accept spiritual and then temporal punishment. Premise (3) requires rigorous defense.

Premise (4) follows from (2) and (3). Premise (5) is true because the Catholic Church forbids apostasy and heresy; presumably, a deputized state will prohibit those acts too; (6) follows from (4) and (5).

Let’s assess objections to (3). Some criticize secular gratitude theory on the grounds that “only a benefactor who makes a special effort or sacrifice is owed a debt of

gratitude."⁹¹ Government officials do not meet this condition. They receive compensation for their efforts. Yet, in the integralist case, Jesus is our benefactor, and He paid the ultimate price for our sins. God made a special effort.

Jesus' sacrifice may not transfer to the officials of the church-authorized state, however, and they might have engaged in no special effort. So, while we owe God a debt of gratitude, we may not owe gratitude to the church-authorized state. If we already knew these agents acted on God's behalf, of course, then our duty to God might transfer to state officials. But we have now assumed that integralism is correct.

A second objection to secular gratitude theories: benefactors cannot always set how one must reciprocate benefits received. As John Simmons argues, benefactors have no right to fix the required response to a gift⁹²; instead, people owe a *fitting* reply. But obeying the state's law may not be the only appropriate response to God. It may even be *unfitting*.

The integralist can respond that *God* may specify a fitting response to the gift of baptism and then direct us to obey His commands on pain of punishment. But do we know that God has specified that obeying the church-authorized state is a fitting response? We would only think so if we adopt integralism. After all, few living Catholic authorities think God has made this specification.

The integralist could try to escape my argument by postulating a proposition that renders their view internally coherent. I have identified the necessary proposition. The baptism dilemma resolves if God determines that we should express gratitude by obeying a church-authorized state.

The trouble is that this supposition is *ad hoc*. It resolves a strict contradiction between norms of integralist justice, but we have no reason to believe it.

Moreover, we must avoid the temptation to appeal to God's will *tout court*. It risks accusations of divine voluntarism. God presumably determines how to reciprocate gratitude for good reasons. We decide whether God has made these determinations based on whether we think He had good reason to do so. Yes, sometimes God reveals God's will and does not give a reason, but integralists seldom defend themselves by bald appeals to divine commands. That approach sounds overly Protestant.

Third, for premise 3 to hold, people need some way to tell that God directs us to submit to temporal punishments for heresy and apostasy. But some baptized children never learn of their benefactor, say if their parents die before they grow old enough to learn of their baptism. Many will lack access to God's complex directives. They may even reject Christianity for rich and subtle reasons that non-Christian groups have formulated for 2000 years. Since the baptized cannot detect the basis for gratitude, they arguably have no liability in the first place. One could respond that the obligation holds even if one cannot tell that one has it, but duties of gratitude seem to require recognition of the benefits and the benefactor.

Finally, the gratitude theory may require that authorities coerce the unbaptized. Baptism licenses religious coercion at least because it provides a good, so why not think other beneficial practices license coercion? Suppose an unbaptized person grows up in an integralist order, and the church gives her life-saving food and medicine. She should be grateful, but her decision to receive these goods does not license religious coercion—gratitude over-justifies coercion in this case.

The benefits provided to the unbaptized pale in comparison to the benefits of baptism. But feeding and healing people have large absolute significance. The integralist must agree that a threshold of benefits exist that, when met, license coercion. Baptism must

exceed the threshold, of course, but life-preserving food and medicine cannot, as this would license coercion of the unbaptized. I am not sure how integralists can set a non-arbitrary threshold.

Let's sharpen the problem by comparing infinite goods. Recall that baptism does not guarantee salvation. One may reject it through grave sin and unbelief. So baptism only bestows an *opportunity* for salvation, and this opportunity must license religious coercion. Now compare proselytization. It provides an opportunity for salvation via the opportunity for baptism, an opportunity for salvation with an additional step in the process. That extra step does not reduce the size or availability of the goods offered. But, by Catholic dogma, gratitude for compelling proselytization does not license coercion. So, I cannot see how gratitude for baptism authorizes force either.

Associative Obligations

Associative theories explain political obligations through political membership. If John is a member of the state, he has duties to obey it. Philosophers motivate associative views on analogy with closer relationships. We gain obligations by becoming parents or by becoming friends. Some of our responsibilities have no deeper explanation than belonging to a group, and we needn't consent to such duties to have them.

Our duties to the church might arise similarly. Baptism makes us members of the body of Christ, assigning enforceable responsibilities. Such obligations sidestep the objections to consent, gratitude, and fair play. Fathers have obligations to their children even if they do not know their children exist. Blaming fathers would be inappropriate until they learn about their children, but once they become aware, their obligations activate. Religious obligations could work similarly. And like parental duties, the state may enforce them.

Associative theories of political obligation face various criticisms. Some argue that citizens lack the close relations that they have with family members.⁹³ Associative accounts of religious duty can bypass this issue. Christians have ties closer than family members; together, we are Christ's bride.⁹⁴

A second objection to associative political theories: some political communities are wicked, and we have no obligation to obey their commands. So, membership cannot ground those obligations. Religious organizations may work similarly. Some religious communities are wicked, and we have no obligation to obey their commands, valid baptism or no.

Integralists can respond that God created the Church, that it is His organization, and so we must obey the church when it speaks for God. Catholics must obey canon law no matter how church leaders behave.

I find this reply perverse. If a church-authorized state abuses someone, a member's obligations dissolve; the point strengthens if the church is complicit. The integralist might respond that the debts to the church remain, but the church and the state lose the right to enforce them. I say that abuse dissolves even the potential authority to enforce.

Let's assume, however, that the church remains a moral community, despite its bad members. Here we can focus on a third objection. Many theorists claim that associative obligations arise from "various subject or will-dependent features" of persons.⁹⁵ To have an associative political obligation requires "associative attitudes." One of these attitudes involves recognizing that one is a member of the relevant organization. Since these attitudes can change, associative obligations can evaporate.⁹⁶ Secular associative theorists may accept these implications, but integralists will hesitate since baptismal status cannot change.

The integralist faces a dilemma: accept the associative attitudes condition or not. If the integralist accepts it, she allows that some baptized people lack associative obligations. In principle, one can receive baptism as an infant and lose the associative attitudes in adulthood.

If the integralist rejects the necessity of associative attitudes, the associative theory weakens. Imagine, once more, a child baptized in the wilderness who grows up unaware that the Catholic Church even exists. Does she have an enforceable obligation to obey the state? The integralist must answer yes, but can stress that the state should not enforce the obligation since culpability is absent.

I find it odd that one can have an obligation she cannot discover, but the integralist may not, so here's a further problem. Let's grant that infant baptism creates associative obligations to obey the church. Even so, state officials and members lack the intimate bonds that hold among members of the church. So, one may have associative duties to the church but not the church-authorized state.

A reply: since we have obligations to the church, we should obey its agents as a holy obligation. But one can question this. Intimacy—the source of associative duties—does not transfer. Suppose Alf is Betty's brother, and Betty is Charlie's sister by marriage. Alf does not thereby have familial intimacy with Charlie. Put another way, if Alf and Betty are great friends, and Betty and Charlie are great friends, Alf and Charlie may be enemies.

Let's then assume that Alf belongs to the church, and the church can deputize the state. It does not follow that Alf has intimate relations with the state. And so, he may lack associative obligations to obey it.

A further problem: one can fulfill associative obligations in many ways. As Bas Van der Vossen puts it:

a requirement to show special concern for fellow members of one's group or to go along with its norms is open to many different interpretations. And it is not up to government officials to determine how subjects fulfill their moral obligations. Disobeying the law, in other words, need not express disrespect to the community.⁹⁷

The integralist response: *God* can determine how subjects fulfill their moral obligations. In that case, a church member has no discretion in upholding her associative duties.

This argument only works if integralism is already true: the citizen must recognize that the church may direct the state to punish her and that God has given the church this power. But suppose she agrees with the vast majority of living Catholic authorities and theologians. In their view, God indeed determines how she should uphold her obligations. But they deny that God does so by authorizing the state to enforce church law, which in turn violates natural law.⁹⁸

Fourth, expatriation usually sheds political obligations. If a state prevents emigration, one may shed political obligations as well. Yet integralists deny that the baptized can ever shed their religious duties. Why? Baptism places us in God's hands, and no one can change that (John 10:29). But associative obligations weaken even in this case.

True, a parent cannot escape her responsibilities to her children by skipping out of town, but apostates do not abandon a weak dependent: they're *all* weak relative to the church and the state that attack them.

The most fundamental problem is this. Associative theories suppose that obligations attach to social relationships and need no deeper explanation. Yet even Aquinas feels

compelled to resolve the baptism dilemma because the tension is plain; associative theories refuse to grapple with it. If integralists wish to convince others, they must explain the most morally counterintuitive feature of their view. An associative theory does not provide an explanation at all.

Natural Duties of Religion

As noted above, another common approach to political obligation is the natural duty of justice. These natural duties are universal—we owe them to everyone. When states specify natural law through positive law, they focus our natural duty of justice. We must submit to this shared legal order because we have no other way to act justly, and so, if a state is reasonably just, we must obey its law.

The integralist could adapt a natural duty view as follows. First, set aside the natural duty of *justice*, as justice is the province of the state.⁹⁹ Turn to the natural duty of *religion*. Recall that the duty of religion is to seek harmony with the greater-than-human order.¹⁰⁰

Catholicism teaches that one can know God's existence through reason, so one has obligations to honor and obey God as reason reveals.¹⁰¹ Perhaps we best discharge this obligation by joining an organization devoted to God.

Suppose that John carries out his natural duty of religion by becoming baptized. Once John is a member of the church, the church makes his duty of religion concrete. John must then obey the church, say by avoiding heresy and apostasy.

How does baptism enter the story? John has a natural duty of religion to join a religious organization, and if John decides to become a Christian, he becomes a member through baptism.¹⁰²

Assume John is a citizen of a just state in submission to the Catholic Church. He becomes baptized and acquires dual citizenship and dual obligations. The church gives form to his natural duty of religion, while the state provides further form by extension. John acquires enforceable religious obligations.

The natural duty approach fails to explain why baptism is a normative transformer. The first problem: John can carry out his natural duty of religion in many ways. Remember that the natural duty of religion requires that we pursue God according to reason. Yet John cannot infer the truths of revelation from reason alone. God must reveal them. Without divine revelation, then, John might discharge his natural duty by joining another theistic religion.

This point holds even if John is baptized. He might not know about his baptism, or he might think it lacks force because he rejects Christianity. In this case, baptism does not make his natural duty of religion concrete. At least not insofar as John can tell.

The integralist can respond as follows. John's baptism still makes his natural duty of religion concrete, no matter what he thinks. John has inherited supernatural virtue and salvation. Period.

But then, why did the integralist appeal to the natural duty of religion? This duty is reflexive.¹⁰³ One can must follow religious obligation as one *understands* religion, so John must honor God as reason requires, but not yet as revelation requires.¹⁰⁴ Baptism only discharges John's duty if he reasonably views the baptismal act as a way of doing his duty. He could easily see things differently. The problem compounds if John's parents baptized him as an infant. In baptism, John is not choosing to do his duty; he is not choosing at all.

Here's a second problem: how does baptism make John's duty of religion concrete? If the answer is that baptism makes John a church member, then we seem to draw on the associative theory of political obligation. If the answer is the reception of benefits, then we seem to draw on the gratitude theory. If gratitude and associative theories fail, the natural duty view then also fails: integralists may as well appeal to those other theories directly.

Consider a third problem. Natural duty theorists agree that John need only obey a reasonably just state: the state must meet some threshold of justice to ground obligations to submit to it. Similarly, the church may need to meet some moral threshold to ground obligations.

Integralists must maintain that baptism creates enforceable obligations regardless of church behavior. But John only does his duty if he joins an organization that he believes helps connect him to God. At some points in church history, John may reasonably think that becoming a Christian *violates* his duty of religion, given bad Christian behavior. Judaism and Islam may appear more reasonable theistic faiths. Or John may decide not to join a theistic religion, but to worship God in his own way.

I leave the reader with a final problem. A duty of justice seems intuitively enforceable, but duties of religion differ. Aquinas, as noted, thinks that forcing people to keep their religious duties is fraught—the proper execution of the obligation must come from the heart, not from threats.

Integralist Injustice

Integralists are inconsistent: they demand religious freedom for the unbaptized but not the baptized. The inconsistency arises because baptism fails as a normative transformer.

Integralists of old reasoned backward. They thought allowing apostasy and heresy could destroy political stability and social unity, but they also knew they had to forbid forced baptism. So, they formulated a rationale, and it proved flimsy. Contemporary integralists have not fixed the problem.

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Notes

1. Raz (1986). Here I mean *political* perfectionism, the doctrine that states may use coercion to advance the authentic human good.
2. Crean and Fimister (2020); Pink (2018a); Waldstein (2016). For overview, see Schwartzman and Wilson (2019). Here I follow Pink's version of integralism, which is best worked out.
3. Hobbes criticizes Catholic and Presbyterian integralism in the latter half of *Leviathan*. Locke criticizes the Anglican integralism of Jonas Proast in his letters on toleration (Hobbes, 1994; Locke, 2009).
4. From here I use "integralism" to denote Catholic integralism.
5. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.
6. ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 3.
7. Finnis (2011: 81–89); Murphy (2001: 100–134).
8. Supernatural goods refer first to eternal beatitude—union and friendship with God. They also denote the supernatural virtues required for unity—faith, hope, and charity. And finally, they reference how God confers union and virtue upon us—the sacraments. These include baptism, the Eucharist, and confession, among others.
9. Leo XIII (2014: 114); Pink (2017: 114).
10. Pink (2012).
11. Fudge (2013: 112–113).
12. Suarez (2015: 853).
13. On the Cathars, see Jones (2017: 36–37). On the Hussites, see Fudge (2013: 41).
14. Bellarmine (2012: 211–225). For the canon law, see Lateran IV, Canon 3.
15. One can only be a heretic if validly baptized.
16. Crean and Fimister (2020: 52) discuss church jurisdiction over the baptized.
17. Suarez (2015: 853).
18. Leo XIII (2014: 148–161).
19. Crean and Fimister (2020: 114). They would not take voting rights away once given.
20. Paul VI (1965).
21. Paul VI (1965: article 4).
22. Paul VI (1965: article 5).
23. Paul VI (1965: article 6).
24. Paul VI (1965).
25. Paul VI (1965: article 9).
26. Paul VI (1965: article 10).
27. Paul VI (1965: Emphasis mine).
28. Paul VI (1965: article 12).
29. Paul VI (1965: article 11).
30. Pink (2017).
31. Leo XIII (2014: 114). Suarez impacted Leo XIII through the "post-1815 restoration of Jesuit intellectual formation" (Pink, 2021).
32. Pius X (1907).
33. Pink (2012).
34. Though this practice had become quite rare.
35. Erasmus (2008: 20–21).
36. Tanner (1990: volume 2, 686).
37. For counterargument, see Finnis (2013: 570–572).
38. Pink (2019: 2).
39. Crean and Fimister (2020; Pink, 2017: 108, ft. 14).
40. See Finnis (2013: 566–577) and Rhonheimer (2014) as replies to Pink.
41. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
42. I thank Alfred Watkins for discussing this point.
43. Of course, many argue that physical coercion is ineffective in matters of faith. Here, I grant that physical coercion can work in matters of faith. If physical coercion fails, integralism is already false.
44. Leo XIII (2014: 112).
45. Leo XIII (2014: 113).
46. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
47. *DH* allows forbidding religious freedoms that threaten public peace and public morality.
48. Chambers (2008: 21).

49. Suarez thought religious coercion could benefit the will, but not to the act of faith itself (Pink, 2018b).
50. Church (1997: 312).
51. Or the desire for baptism, if it is unavailable.
52. Church (1997: 321).
53. Church (1997: 322).
54. Church (1997: 323).
55. Church (1997: 324).
56. One might shed *enforceable* obligations by expatriating, but then apostates and heretics would emigrate.
57. An infant has a will, even if she cannot direct it.
58. From here, I presume that baptized citizens have these liabilities.
59. Jone (1946: 7) calls ignorance vincible when one can dispel it through appropriate “moral diligence.”
60. See Finnis (1998) and Finnis (2013) for an alternative, integralism-incompatible reading.
61. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.
62. Reichberg (2020: 10).
63. Reichberg (2020: 11).
64. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.
65. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 7, obj. 3.
66. Aquinas (1951: 176) [no. 935].
67. Reichberg (2020: 15).
68. Reichberg (2020: 16).
69. See Fourth Council of Toledo (633). See ST, III, p. 68, a. 10.
70. Reichberg (2020: 17).
71. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 5.
72. ST, II-II, q. 12, a. 2.
73. Pennington (2014: 8).
74. I take no stand on whether Aquinas endorses integralist religious coercion.
75. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8, ad. 3 compares baptism to vowing (again, not identifying the two).
76. Aquinas does not *identify* baptism with a vow, but *analogizes* the two in the *responsum ad 3*. Thanks to John Finnis for this point.
77. ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.
78. Reichberg (2020: 19).
79. Reichberg (2020: 20).
80. Suarez appears to follow Aquinas (Reichberg, 2020: 38; Suarez, 2015: 333–340/685–702).
81. Reichberg (2020: 47). Johnson and Koyama (2019) claim that many religions believe that civic unity requires shared faith (Suarez, 2015: 479/763).
82. Pink (2013: 94, 104).
83. Miller (2012: 16–17). Emphasis mine.
84. Miller (2012: 17). See <https://lumenscholasticum.wordpress.com/2016/10/24/edouard-hugon-o-p-on-baptism-of-children/>. I thank an anonymous commentator and Timothy Wilson for the reference.
85. I thank Steve Wall for discussion.
86. Habib (2014: 23).
87. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/#FaiPla>. Fair play obligations arise when a practice is just, however, and punishing the baptized may be unjust.
88. Stilz (2009); Wellman (2005).
89. ST, II-II, q. 81 (Finnis, 2011: 89–90).
90. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gratitude/#GraPoIObl>, (Walker, 1988: 205).
91. Simmons (1981: 170).
92. Simmons (2008: 34).
93. Dagger (2000); Wellman (1997).
94. Although one might object that Christians may not know they are so related.
95. van der Vossen (2011a: 491).
96. van der Vossen (2011a).
97. van der Vossen (2011b: 484).
98. A perfect society argument cannot help here since the Church would only have powers that respect natural law. I thank Alfredo Watkins for discussion.
99. Finnis (1998: 219–233).
100. ST II-II, q. 81, Finnis (2011: pp. 89–90).

101. Church (1997: 18).
102. The church acquires *jurisdiction* over baptized citizens, at least within state territory (Pink, 2018c). I prefer the language of *authority*.
103. Finnis et al. (1987: 107).
104. One could still affirm that coercion can strengthen belief among the baptized (Pink, 2018b).

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